Guides · 5 min read

Using where you are without recording who you are

A location trace is close to a fingerprint: a handful of points is usually enough to single you out. Here is what can be done about that, and what a distributed ledger does and does not add.

Why location is different

Most personal data describes you. Location data describes you, everyone you meet, and the pattern of your life at once. Where you sleep and where you spend the working day are together enough to name most people, and studies of mobility traces have repeatedly found that a few timestamped points identify an individual within a large population.

It is also the data a service genuinely needs. A map cannot route you without knowing where you are, and a crowd-sensing application — measuring air quality, traffic, network coverage from thousands of phones — is worthless without positions attached. So blanket refusal is not an engineering answer.

Blurring, and its limits

The first family of defences reduces precision. Report a cell rather than a point. Report a region containing at least k other users, the spatial version of k-anonymity. Or, in the more modern formulation called geo-indistinguishability, add noise drawn so that nearby locations are provably hard to tell apart — the same shape of guarantee as differential privacy, applied to a map.

These work against a single snapshot and much less well against a trace. Blur each point independently and the path still shows the route, because the points are not independent. Anyone designing this for the first time underestimates how much correlation leaks.

What a ledger is actually for

The other half of the problem is not the data but the arrangement. In crowd-sensing, one server typically collects the readings, decides whether they are any good, and pays for them — so it has to know who to pay, which means it holds identity and position together, permanently, by design.

A distributed ledger is useful here for a narrow and unglamorous reason: it lets those roles be split. Contributions and payments can be recorded and verified without a single party holding the link between a contributor and their readings, and the record of what was agreed is auditable afterwards by anyone. That is the idea behind the crowd-sensing work in this thread.

It is worth saying plainly what a blockchain does not do. It does not make data private — a public ledger is the most durable publication mechanism ever built, and anything written to it is written forever. Privacy comes from what you choose not to put on it. That is also why permissioned designs are interesting for business settings: in R3 Corda, which the trade-management work here builds on, a transaction is shared only with its counterparties rather than broadcast, which is the property a trade record actually needs.

What to read next

Outside work, not mine. Each title links to a Google Scholar search, which will find you whichever version is open access.

2003
Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal CloakingMarco Gruteser and Dirk GrunwaldThe origin of location cloaking, and still the clearest statement of the idea.
2013
Geo-Indistinguishability: Differential Privacy for Location-Based SystemsMiguel Andrés, Nicolás Bordenabe, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis and Catuscia PalamidessiHow to get a differential-privacy-style guarantee on a map, and what it costs in accuracy.